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Much of this paper is drawn from Misak 2020. I thank Christoph Limbeck-Lilineau, the
reviewers of this volume, and the participants of the Vienna conference on European
Pragmatism for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
 
1. Ramsey’s Reputation
1 Frank Ramsey is often aligned with the Vienna Circle. He was listed in the Circle’s 1929
“Manifesto” as one of those “sympathetic” to their mission (Carnap, Hahn & Neurath 1973
[1929]:  318).  It  might be said that being listed in the Manifesto didn’t  mean much: a
number of people were invoked there, without, it seems, their foreknowledge or consent,
and the document itself was controversial within the Circle. But the idea that Ramsey was
on board with the Vienna Circle’s mission wasn’t confined to their official announcement.
In the 1950s, Carnap and Hempel would take Ramsey’s paper “Theories,” posthumously
published in 1931, to be an important contribution to their own attempts to construct
scientific theories from observation and logic. Hans-Johann Glock has recently said that
Ramsey was “pre-eminent” amongst the school of Cambridge analysts, who shared with
the Vienna Circle and Wittgenstein the idea that “simple propositions occur in complex
ones only in such a way that the truth-value of the latter depends solely on those of the
former.” According to Glock, the Cambridge analyst’s “attempts to reduce all meaningful
propositions to truth-functional constructions out of elementary propositions referring
to sense-data were no more successful than Russell’s fledgling attempts and Carnap’s
heroic effort in Der logische Aufbau der Welt” (2008: 80-1).
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2 His connection with Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is largely responsible for the perception that
Ramsey was aligned with the Vienna Circle. Wittgenstein’s biographer, Ray Monk, says
that  Ramsey was “unable to follow [Wittgenstein]  in his  radical  departures from the
theory of the Tractatus” and suggests that Ramsey may be the stupid man in the following
dream, which Wittgenstein reported to his diary in 1929:1
This morning I dreamt: I had a long time ago commissioned someone to make me a
water-wheel and now I no longer wanted it but he was still working on it. The wheel
lay there and it was bad; it was notched all around, perhaps in order to put the
blades in (as in the motor of a steam turbine). He explained to me what a tiresome
task it was, and I thought: I  had ordered a straightforward paddle-wheel,  which
would have been simple to make. The thought tormented me that the man was too
stupid to explain to him or to make a better wheel, and that I could do nothing but
leave him to it. I thought: I have to live with people to whom I cannot make myself
understood. That is a thought that I actually do have often. At the same time with
the feeling that it is my own fault. (Monk 1990: 276)
3 While Wittgenstein never thought himself signed up with the Vienna Circle, he certainly
had a sustained engagement with them from 1929 till the mid-1930s. And he was quick to
accuse Waismann and Carnap of plagiarizing his ideas. Wittgenstein had, in step with the
Circle,  reduced  all  meaningful  language  to  an  elementary  language  of  simple,  basic
statements that hook on to simple objects in the world. The Circle took the Tractatus to be
the “deepest and truest” work of “the new philosophy” (Schlick 1927). 
4 Ramsey died in January 1930, shortly after Wittgenstein’s dream and the Vienna Circle’s
claiming of him. He was just 26 years old, robbed of the opportunity to develop and sum
up his work, and to put it in careful relation to the traditions in which he operated. It falls
to others to piece together the record and put it straight. For in fact, Ramsey argued,
against  Wittgenstein  and  the  Vienna  Circle,  that  it  was  impossible  to  reduce  all
meaningful  propositions  to  a  primary  language  of  experience  and logic.  He  was  not
aligned with the Vienna Circle’s mission, but rather, was a self-described pragmatist. His
persistent  pragmatist  objections  to  the  “picture  theory”  of  meaning  and truth  were
responsible  for  Wittgenstein’s  turn  away  from  the  Tractatus and  towards  his  latter
approach, with its emphasis on the primacy of practice and the idea that meaning is use.2
And Ramsey’s objections were of the kind that would make some members of the Vienna
Circle liberalize their own positions after his death.
5 Ramsey of course had things in common with the Vienna Circle, such as an interest in the
foundations of mathematics and the relationship between propositions and reality, and a
facility  with  logical  methods.  It’s  not  surprising  that  he  was  interested  in  talking
philosophy with them.3 Their problems were his problems, even if he didn’t agree with
their solutions. And Ramsey was indeed initially engaged with Wittgenstein’s project, and
tried to improve some aspects of it.4 But even as an undergraduate, as early as 1923, he
was arguing that the primary or elementary language was not sufficient to account for
the great variety of legitimate and truth-apt beliefs. We shall see that, while Ramsey did
indeed have an influence on the Vienna Circle, he ended up pulling against, not toward,
their project. 
 
2. Introducing the Tractatus to the Circle
6 In 1921, at the age of 18, Ramsey was asked by the publisher C. K. Ogden to translate the
manuscript  that  Wittgenstein  had  finished  during  the  First  World  War.  Russell  and
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Keynes had managed to get it  out of war-torn Europe and, with the help of Dorothy
Wrinch, get it printed, full of errors and without any revision by its author. That was in a
German journal, Annalen der Naturphilosophie. Wittgenstein was keen to have it come out
in English. Ramsey was well-versed in logic and in Russell’s philosophy, and was keen to
do it. He went to Miss Pate’s secretarial agency in the winter of 1921-22 and directly read
this difficult manuscript in English – off the Annalen proofs – to a shorthand writer, who
then typed it up. After much correspondence, with Wittgenstein making corrections to
his own thinking and to the translation, it was published in 1922, with the German and
Ramsey’s  English  translation  side-by-side.  Ogden took  the  credit  for  the  translation,
merely expressing “his indebtedness to Mr F. P. Ramsey, of Trinity College, Cambridge,
for assistance both with the translation and in the preparation of the book for the press”
(Wittgenstein 1922). No one at the time, however, took anyone but Ramsey to have done
the job.5
7 In September 1923 Ramsey went to the small town near Vienna, where Wittgenstein was
teaching school, and the two finally met. For two weeks, they went over the Tractatus line
by  line,  for  5  hours  a  day.  At  this  point,  Ramsey  was  the  only  person  who  really
understood  the  Tractatus.  (Wittgenstein  had  declared  that  Moore,  Russell,  and  Frege
didn’t understand him.) Ramsey’s critical notice of the book was in press at Mind, and he
was relieved, during his marathon conversation with Wittgenstein, to find that he still
thought it was basically right.
8 In March 1924, Ramsey went to Vienna for six months, both to be psychoanalyzed and to
spend more time talking with Wittgenstein.  Gretl  Stonborough,  Wittgenstein’s  sister,
introduced  him  to  Schlick.  Ramsey’s  first  impression  of  Schlick  remained  steady
throughout his life: “he didn’t seem to me much of a philosopher, but a very nice man.”6
The Cambridge mathematician Max Newman was in Vienna as well, and introduced him
to Hans Hahn, who granted Ramsey permission to use the University library and invited
him to attend his seminar on Theory of Functions of a Complex Variable. Ramsey didn’t
attend Hahn’s seminar, but he did rue that he wouldn’t be in Vienna the following year,
when Hahn was to give a seminar on Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica. 
9 It was during this 1924 visit that the emerging Vienna Circle (and the Berlin Circle) was
properly introduced to the Tractatus.7 Carnap had been in New York in 1923, when some
mathematicians  told  him  about  Russell’s  influence  on  the  new  “mathematical
philosophy.”  Carnap  wrote  to  Reichenbach  about  the  people  connected  to  this  new
philosophy. The list was long. It included Wittgenstein, Keynes, and Broad, but gave no
particular  importance  to  Wittgenstein.  Reichenbach  immediately  forwarded  Carnap’s
letter to Schlick, and asked Schlick to write to Russell (with no mention of Wittgenstein)
to see if Russell might be interested in being involved in a journal they were planning.
Schlick  then  wrote  to  Reichenbach  and  noted  that  one  of  those  new  mathematical
philosophers was nearby: “Wittgenstein, whose book is edited by Russell, lives here close
to Vienna.”8 It seems that Schlick didn’t yet have a copy of the revised and translated
Tractatus, for he didn’t know that Russell was not in fact the book’s editor, but merely
wrote the Introduction. His University Library had one copy of the substandard Annalen
version, but it isn’t clear whether Schlick had looked at it at the time he was exchanging
these letters in 1923.
10 That would change in the summer of 1924, when Schlick met Ramsey. Schlick wrote to
Reichenbach on August 5. He was no longer merely mentioning Wittgenstein, but was
fired up about him. He had now read the Annalen version:
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Do  you  know  the  “Tractatus-logico-philosophicus”  from  L. Wittgenstein,  which
appeared in the Annals of Natural Philosophy and which has been edited by Russell
in a book version in German and English? The author lives close to Vienna, and is
highly original, also as a human being; the more one studies his treatise, the more
one is impressed by it. The English translator, a mathematician from Cambridge,
whom I met in the summer, is also a very intelligent and sophisticated mind.9
11 Schlick then wrote to Wittgenstein on Christmas Day, expressing his admiration of the
Tractatus and his desire to meet its author. He told him that the mathematician, Kurt
Reidemeister had recently given a talk at the University of Vienna about the Tractatus,
and mentioned that “last summer I had the pleasure to meet Mr. Ramsey, the translator
of your work, during his last stay in Vienna.”10 Schlick asked Wittgenstein how he and
Reidemeister might get their own copies of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein wrote back, saying
he himself didn’t have spares, but Ramsey “would certainly be kind enough to arrange for
some copies.”11 By early 1925, the Circle was in possession of the Ramsey translation.
12 The Vienna Circle read the Tractatus with care and attention, steadily until 1927, taking it
to be a kind of founding document of their movement. While there was some plurality
already in the view of the members of the Vienna Circle, it’s fair enough to say that they
differed from Wittgenstein in that they explicitly said that the basic statements were
observation statements, whereas Wittgenstein was vague on this matter. And the Circle
ignored  Wittgenstein’s  insistence  that  the  propositions  of  ethics  and  religion  were
without  sense,  yet  more  important  than  the  propositions  which  had  sense.  These
differences aside, the Circle took Wittgenstein, not unreasonably, to be a kindred spirit.
One insight of Wittgenstein’s was especially important. That was the idea that the truths
of logic are tautologies,  true,  come what may,  and hence exempt from the empirical
standard of meaningfulness. Their interest in Ramsey in 1924 was very much related to
this point.
3. Logic and Mathematics as Tautology
13 Ramsey wrote “The Foundations of Mathematics,” his undergraduate thesis, while he was
in Vienna and published it in the 1925 Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society. In it,
he tried to fix the “defects” in Principia Mathematica. At this point, Ramsey was on board
with Russell’s  logicist  project  and spent  most  of  the paper  trying to  repair  Russell’s
solution to logicism’s biggest problem – the set theoretic paradoxes.  He argued for a
modification of Russell’s theory of types that could do without the Axiom of Reducibility. 
14 The Vienna Circle was open to new ideas, from Cambridge especially. They had devoured
Principia and  the  Tractatus.  “The  Foundation  of  Mathematics”  provided  the  next
discussion  point.  Ramsey  sent  Schlick  the  published  paper,  writing  “With  the
compliments of the author” on the first page. Carnap transcribed parts of it and Schlick
scribbled comments on the whole of his copy. We can see from Carnap’s Tagebuch that
the Circle talked about the paper for two weeks in January 1927 and then intermittently
right through to 1929. The first entry in January notes: “Waismann told us about the
Ramsey  paper.”  The  next  week:  “We  talked  about  Wittgenstein  and  Ramsey.  Very
interesting.”12
15 What  they  found  very  interesting  was  Ramsey’s  extension  of  Wittgenstein’s  idea  of
tautology. Like all empiricists, the members of the Vienna Circle struggled to say why the
statements of logic and mathematics are legitimate, given that they don’t satisfy their
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observational  criterion  of  meaningfulness.  Hume  had  invoked  a  too-convenient
separation of matters of fact and relations of ideas, with statements concerning the latter
(including  mathematical  and  logical  statements)  simply  being  exempt  from  the
observational criterion. Mill had made an unsuccessful attempt to treat mathematics as
an observable science. The Vienna Circle had been happy to find part of their own answer
in the Tractatus. The truths of logic fit with any state of the world. Hence, they make no
claims about the world and do not need to be verified by the world. But what about
mathematics? Wittgenstein held that mathematical concepts consist of purely syntactic
or formal equations. He thought they didn’t have sense, but not in the way that logic
lacks sense. 
16 Ramsey claimed that Wittgenstein’s position was “obviously a ridiculously narrow view of
mathematics,” as it was confined to simple arithmetic (FM: 180).  Ramsey argued that
mathematical truths, like logical truths, are tautologies. Russell wanted to build up the
whole edifice of mathematics from primitive principles, and Ramsey thought he should
do it by taking primitive logical and mathematical propositions to be tautologies, so that
everything that he built up will be necessarily true. 
17 As far as the Circle was concerned,  the two moves taken together – first  logic,  then
mathematics,  being  seen  as  tautologies  –  were  a  fundamental  turning  point  in
philosophy.13 Hahn was especially clear that the tautological character of mathematics is
absolutely essential: “If this position can be made out […] the existence of mathematics is
then also compatible with the empiricist position.” (1980 [1931]: 34). Ramsey had given
them a nice way out of a difficult problem.
 
4. The Dispute Between Ramsey and Wittgenstein
about Identity
18 Wittgenstein himself staunchly resisted the suggestion. His resistance manifested itself in
a dispute with Ramsey about the nature of identity statements, a dispute that involved
the Circle, at least as minor players in the drama. On June 20, 1927, Wittgenstein, Carnap,
and Waismann met with Schlick at his house. It was the first time that Carnap had met
Wittgenstein. They discussed Ramsey’s paper, and Wittgenstein registered an objection to
the account of identity in it. Carnap wrote in his in his diary afterwards that Wittgenstein
was very interesting and original. But he thought that his objections to Ramsey were such
that he took a rapid or impulsive position and then tried to find arguments for that
assessment. One week later, on the 27th, they all met again, this time at Carnap’s house.
On this second meeting, Wittgenstein dictated a letter to Schlick, for delivery to Ramsey.
(Wittgenstein was giving Ramsey the silent treatment, because of an argument they had
had in 1925 about the value of Freud.) Carnap typed the letter, and Wittgenstein then
wrote the opening and closing paragraphs by hand. He addressed it to “Dear Mr. Ramsey”
and it asked Mr. Ramsey to send a response to the logical point not directly to him, but
via Schlick.14
19 Ramsey considered not following Wittgenstein’s instructions to write only to Schlick. He
wrote two draft replies to Wittgenstein himself, saying that Schlick “won’t know whether
my answer is any good.” He also said that Schlick’s 1918 Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (The
General Theory of Knowledge) contained some “sad rubbish,” but was willing to consider the
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possibility that “he may have got cleverer since then.” In the end, he obeyed his difficult
friend and sent his reply via Schlick. 
20 Wittgenstein had an identity statement being part of mathematics, and hence consisting
of  “equations”  and  “therefore  pseudo-propositions.”  Ramsey  thought  that  identity
statements were true, but trivially so – they were tautologies.15 The debate, conducted in
its  entirety  is  this  two-letter  exchange,  would  soon  be  moot.  Immediately  after  the
publication of “The Foundations of Mathematics,” Ramsey expressed doubts about it, and
in 1929, he would abandon the logicist project and start actively exploring intuitionism.
He wrote two long notes in August 1929, “Principles of Finitest Mathematics” and “The
Formal  Structure  of  Intuitionist  Mathematics,”  in  which  he  opted  mostly  for  Weyl’s
introduction rules and arrived at his own substitution rules.16 Wittgenstein, who returned
to Cambridge in January 1929, was also at that point interested in intuitionism. Together,
they would become attracted to what Ramsey in “The Foundations of Mathematics” had
called  “the  Bolshevik  menace  of  Brouwer  and  Weyl”  (FM:  219).  When  Braithwaite
published a collection of Ramsey’s papers, posthumously in 1931, he sounded the alert in
introduction that Ramsey had abandoned logicism for intutionism. It  took Russell  by
surprise.17
21 Also in 1931, it seems not yet having read Braithwaite’s introduction, Carnap registered a
worry  about  Ramsey’s  logicism.18 He  said  that  Ramsey  “courageously”  tried  to  solve
Russell’s problems by arguing that the circles of the set theoretic paradoxes are harmless,
not vicious. Carnap thought that Ramsey’s solution was “certainly tempting,” but “we
should not let ourselves be seduced by it.” It smacked too much of “a platonic realm of
ideas which exist in themselves independently of if and how finite human beings are able
to  think  them.”  While  intuitionism,  he  said,  has  been  called  “anthropological
mathematics,” Ramsey’s logicist theory might well be called “theological mathematics”
(1983 [1931]: 39). Ramsey’s notes about intuitionism were only published in 199119 and the
Circle  never  registered  that  Ramsey  had  moved  away  from  the  conception  of
mathematics as tautology – the conception of mathematics that was so useful to them. 
 
5. “Facts and Propositions”
22 While Ramsey’s move away from logicism was only noticed after his death, evidence that
he wasn’t aligned with Circle’s project certainly existed in at least one paper the Circle
read during his lifetime. “Facts and Propositions” was published in the 1927 Proceedings of
the  Aristotelian  Society,  and  was  mentioned  in  the  Manifesto  as  one  of  Ramsey’s
sympathetic papers. In it, he utilized Wittgenstein’s conception of tautology in a novel
way.  Wittgenstein  had argued (in  Ramsey’s  words)  that  “a  logical  truth excludes  no
possibility and so expresses no attitude of belief at all” (FP: 47). Ramsey built on this idea
to arrive at one of his most fruitful insights. Beliefs exclude possibilities, and that’s how
we can  a)  individuate  belief  and  b)  measure  partial  belief.  What  it  is  to  believe  a
proposition is, in large part, to behave in certain ways, and to take various possibilities as
alive or dead. This pragmatist position holds that it is of the essence of a belief that it has
a causal impact on our actions. 
23 In  this  paper,  Ramsey  made  a  remark  about  truth  that  many  have  mistaken  for  a
“deflationary” or “redundancy” theory, in which talk of truth is a superfluous add-on and
can be simply dropped:
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there is really no separate problem of truth but merely a linguistic muddle […] “It is
true that Caesar was murdered” means no more than that Caesar was murdered,
and “It is false that Caesar was murdered” means that Caesar was not murdered […].
(FP: 38)
24 But Ramsey argued that once you have laid out the matter in this way, it becomes clear
that it is the nature of belief, judgement, or assertion that is the interesting problem. He
prefaced his deflationary remark by saying that he should briefly discuss truth “before
we proceed further with the analysis of judgment,” and he finished the whole discussion
by concluding that if we have analysed judgment “we have solved the problem of truth”
(FP: 39). Yes, the assertion of the truth of p is equivalent to the assertion that p. But that
leaves all the hard work still ahead of us. The deflationary move must be followed by an
examination of belief, judgement, and assertion, which will provide us with a complete
theory of truth. 
25 Ramsey then proceeded with his pragmatist examination. Belief, he argues, involves a
habit or disposition to behave. It is not reducible to behavior, as there is still a mental
factor involved. And there are still objective factors to be taken into account. If a chicken
“believes” that a certain caterpillar is poisonous, it  abstains from eating that kind of
caterpillar on account of the unpleasant experiences associated with eating them:
The mental factors in such a belief would be parts of the chicken’s behaviour, which
are  somehow  related  to  the  objective  factors,  viz.  the  kind  of  caterpillar  and
poisonousness.  An exact  analysis  of  this  relation would  be  very  difficult,  but  it
might well be held that in regard to this kind of belief the pragmatist view was
correct,  i.e.  that the relation between the chicken’s behaviour and the objective
factors was that the actions were such as to be useful if, and only if, the caterpillars
were actually poisonous. (FP: 40)
26 Ramsey is close to adopting a certain kind of pragmatist account of truth in this passage.
If a belief leads to successful action, it is true. But importantly for his kind of pragmatism,
the success of the action must be connected to the belief being related in the right way to
the  relevant  objective  factors.20 “Facts  and  Propositions”  is  thus  Ramsey’s  official
rejection of the correspondence, logical analyst theory that so attracted Moore, Russell,
Wittgenstein, and the Vienna Circle. At this stage, he thought Wittgenstein might easily
join him. He ended the paper by saying:
In conclusion, I must emphasize my indebtedness to Mr. Wittgenstein, from whom
my view of logic is derived. Everything that I have said is due to him, except the
parts which have a pragmatist tendency, which seem to me to be needed in order to
fill up a gap in his system. (FP: 51)
27 Wittgenstein would not take the pragmatist suggestion to be a friendly amendment. And
the Vienna Circle glossed over the pragmatist tenor of “Facts and Propositions.” If they
liked it because of the deflationary idea of truth, they misread that paper.
 
6. Ramsey’s Critical Notice of the Tractatus
28 How can the Circle have got Ramsey so wrong? Part of the answer may be that there is no
evidence that they read Ramsey’s Critical Notice of the Tractatus, published in Mind in
1923. It would have alerted them to Ramsey’s worries about Wittgenstein’s project, and by
extension, their own.
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29 Ramsey had remarked in his Critical Notice that Russell’s introduction may not be “an
infallible guide to Mr. Wittgenstein’s meaning,” for Russell said that Wittgenstein was
concerned with a logically perfect language. But Wittgenstein, Ramsey wrote,
seems  to  maintain  that  his  doctrines  apply  to  ordinary  languages  in  spite  of
appearances  to  the  contrary.  […]  This  is  obviously  an  important  point,  for  this
wider application greatly increases the interest and diminishes the plausibility of
any  thesis  such  as  that  which  Mr.  Russell  declares  to  be  perhaps  the  most
fundamental in Mr. Wittgenstein’s theory; that “In order that a certain sentence
should assert a certain fact there must […] be something in common between the
structure of the sentence and the structure of the fact.” (CN: 465) 
30 Ramsey agreed with Wittgenstein that his doctrines should apply to ordinary language,
but the linchpin for the pressing, and eventually fatal, problems Ramsey raised for the
Tractatus is that they failed to do so.
31 Ramsey noted that there are two things at work in the Tractatus. One is “the non-mystical
deductions” that occupy most of the text – the arguing in detail for “the necessity of
something in common between the picture and the world” (CN: 468). The other consists
of indicating or gesturing at all the things that are “intrinsically impossible to discuss”
(CN: 468). He saw difficulties arising for both. That is, he threw spanners into the works of
Wittgenstein’s elaborate machinery (the picture theory of meaning) and he worried about
the main contention of the book, as Wittgenstein himself saw it (the distinction between
saying and showing). 
32 The idea of representation in the Tractatus is that the picture has the same structure, or
the same logical form, as reality. Ramsey’s most general objection,21 which hangs over the
whole of Wittgenstein’s project, is this:
But it is evident that, to say the least, this definition is very incomplete; it can be
applied  literally  only  in  one  case,  that  of  the  completely  analysed  elementary
proposition. (CN: 469)
33 Ramsey made note of some propositions that cannot be reduced to elementary sentences
that  correspond to  simple  objects.  For  instance,  what  about  those  containing logical
connectives, such as ‘~’ and ‘v’, which do not have objects to represent? Wittgenstein
treated these as operators on propositions, and thought that we could use such symbols
to express things that we cannot state,  but can only show. Ramsey thought that this
subverted the simple isomorphic structure that Wittgenstein was supposed to be putting
in place. The negation operator ‘~’ illustrates the problem perfectly. The Tractatus gives
us an account of representation, understanding, and truth that is essentially positive.22 To
understand a proposition is to see how things are if it is true. All elementary propositions
depict  positive  facts,  and  the  world  is  fully  described  by  one  unique  set  of  such
propositions. Ramsey noted that it would be “absurd” to represent ~(aRb) as mirroring a
negative fact, and was not mollified by Wittgenstein’s rendering of ‘~’ as saying that that
there is no such combination between objects or things. 
34 But it was not just the logical connectives that couldn’t be pictured in the elementary
language. Ramsey announced: “We must now turn to one of the most interesting of Mr.
Wittgenstein’s  theories,  that  there  are  certain things  which cannot  be  said  but  only
shown, and these constitute the Mystical.” (CN: 472). He registered in the “Critical Notice”
what  would  later  become  a  more  fully-formed  unease  about  the  saying/showing
distinction.  Wittgenstein’s  form of representation is  itself  an “elusive entity which is
intrinsically  impossible  to  discuss.”  That  is,  Wittgenstein’s  own  discussion  of  what
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representation is goes beyond elementary propositions. Wittgenstein of course saw this,
saying that his philosophical discussion had to be used like a ladder and then kicked
away. Ramsey thought this an unacceptable move. His conclusion in the “Critical Notice”
is  that  “we  cannot  be  satisfied  with  a  theory  that  deals  only  with  elementary
propositions.” Later he would put the point more sharply: “But what we can’t say we can’t
say, and we can’t whistle it either.” (GPC: 146).
35 It should be clear that already in 1923, Ramsey was not trying to get the logical analyst
view right. Much of what is important about language cannot be reduced to a primary
language,  and  we  cannot  sweep  the  secondary  language  under  a  rug  as  unsayable
(Wittgenstein) or merely instrumental (some of the members of the Vienna Circle).
 
7. What about “Theories”?
36 Braithwaite included Ramsey’s 1929 manuscript “Theories” in the volume he published in
1931. In the 1950s, Carnap and Hempel would famously employ what they called Ramsey
Sentences. But it is important to see that, by that time, Carnap and Hempel had relaxed
their reductive tendencies. At the time of writing “Theories,” Ramsey took it to be pulling
away from Carnap, not towards him.
37 To be sure, Ramsey started “Theories” as follows:
Let us try to describe a theory simply as a language for discussing the facts the
theory is said to explain. (T: 112)
38 He started,  that  is,  with the idea held by Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle  in the
mid-1920s – facts are expressible in the “universe of discourse which we will call the
primary system” (T: 112) or the primary language, which expresses simple propositions
that  are  absolutely  true  or  false.  He  then argued that  when we  try,  we  can indeed
construct a theory, using a set of axioms and a dictionary that translates the primary
language into the secondary language.  But  he is clear  that  these definitions  are  not
necessary for the “legitimate use of the theory” (T: 129). It is merely “instructive” to show
how such definitions could be constructed. Part of the instruction is to show how it might
be done, for Russell, Carnap, and others “seem to suppose that we can and must do this” (
T: 120). But part of the instruction is negative. Ramsey thought that the project wouldn’t
work.  The  first  obstacle,  perhaps  surmountable,  is  how  complicated  it  will  be.  For
instance, if the primary language is concerned with a series of experiences, it needs “time
order” and a structure for things like colour and smells.
39 The second, less surmountable, obstacle is what Ramsey (elsewhere) calls the “objection
from the philosophy of science” (OT: 35). A problem for the Vienna Circle was that there
seems to be no meaning to our beliefs about unobservable entities such as electrons, or
even the backside of the moon being made of green cheese. For we can’t directly observe
them. Moreover,  there is  also no way of accounting for how the theory of  mass,  for
instance, changes or is improved upon. On the explicit definition account of scientific
theories, it seems that every time the theory changes, we change the meanings of the
terms in the older versions or refer to new entities. As Ramsey put it, “if we proceed by
explicit definition we cannot add to our theory without changing the definitions, and so
the meaning of the whole” (T: 130). He takes it as obvious that we need to be able to
explain how a concept both evolves and retains its meaning, and how a theory grows.
Thus, “the dictionary alone does not suffice,” unless we are happy with a finite, primary
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system much less rich than the theory itself (T: 122ff). All “useful theories” must have
“more degrees of freedom” than the primary system. There would be no point in having a
scientific theory unless it went beyond a catalogue of the current facts. Ramsey, that is,
showed  that Carnap’s  project,  as  Ramsey  understood  it  from  the  Aufbau,  could  be
completed, but would be no good at all. 
40 He  then  instructed  the  empiricist  on  how  to  think  of  scientific  theories,  without
employing  explicit  definitions.  In  keeping  with  his  pragmatism,  he  highlighted  the
consequences of belief. A theory is a system of judgments or beliefs, whose consequences
will meet the future successfully or not. We employ the theory as a whole, as a shorthand
expression of all those judgments, and can thus make sense of unobservable things, such
as the back of the moon:
If our theory allows as a possibility that we might go there or find out in any other
way, then it has meaning. If not, not; i.e. our theory of the moon is very relevant, not
merely our theory of things in general. (T: 134)
41 Our theory of the moon, and of solid bodies in space, will tell us something about the
likely constitution of the moon’s far side – the whole theory gives meaning to beliefs
about the unobservable part of the moon and determines whether they are true or false.
42 Ramsey then made a new move, the idea that would later excite Carnap and Hempel. He
argued that we can elucidate the role of theoretical terms such as “electron” in a long and
complex formal sentence which contains both theoretical and observational terms. The
sentence will start with: “There are things which we call electrons, which […],” and then
will go on to tell a story about those electrons. We assume there are electrons for the sake
of the story, just as we assume there is a girl when we listen to a story that starts “Once
upon a time there was a girl, who […].” Any additions to the theory are to be made within
the scope of the quantifier that says that there exists at least one electron. That is, the
theory can evolve while still being about the original entities. Additions to the theory of
electrons are not “strictly propositions by themselves just as the different sentences in a
story  beginning  ‘Once  upon  a  time’  have  not  complete  meanings  and  so  are  not
propositions by themselves” (T: 131). That is, they are not beliefs that are true or false in
the strict sense of the primary language. We commit ourselves to the existence of the
entities in our theory, knowing that if it gets overthrown, so will our commitment to its
entities. In the meantime, we use the theory. 
43 This innovation is entirely consistent with Ramsey’s pragmatist view of definitions in
1929: definitions “are to give at least our future meaning, and not merely to give any
pretty way of obtaining a certain structure” (P: 1). Definitions tell us how to go on using a
term by making more precise the vague and complex concept it stands for. While this
view of definitions and theories didn’t serve the 1929 Vienna Circle well,  it would be
attractive once the Circle had given up on the strict reductionist project, largely due to
those objections from the philosophy of science.
44 We can see from Carnap’s copy of the Braithwaite volume, that he read “Theories” in the
early 1930s carefully.23 Hempel heard of Ramsey’s idea much later, from Braithwaite’s
1946 Tarner Lectures.24 In the early 1950s Carnap and Hempel started to employ Ramsey’s
existentially quantified sentences as a tool in their attempts to show how the world can
be constructed from experience.25 The origin of the idea had become hazy in Carnap’s
mind,  only  to  become  clear  again  when  in  1958  he  read  a  draft  of  Hempel’s  “The
Theoretician’s Dilemma: A study in the logic of theory construction,” in which Hempel
coined the term “Ramsey Sentence.” Carnap wrote to Hempel, saying that his paper had
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prompted  him  to  go  back  to  the  Braithwaite  volume  and  see  that  he  had  “neatly
underlined” important passages in “Theories,” and expressing his gratitude for being
prevented from presenting Ramsey’s idea as his own.26 In 1966, Carnap sent Braithwaite
his Philosophical Foundations of Physics, which had a chapter titled “The Ramsey Sentence.”
45 That Carnap wasn’t ready to employ Ramsey’s innovation in 1929 is unsurprising. At that
time, as Keynes put it, Ramsey had been “departing […] from the formal and objective
treatment.” That treatment marked Carnap’s work at the time. Ramsey and Wittgenstein
had started off by helping Russell  to perfect the system of Principia Mathematica.  But,
Keynes said, the effect was 
gradually to empty it of content and to reduce it more and more to mere dry bones,
until finally it seemed to exclude not only all experience, but most of the principles
[…] of reasonable thought. Wittgenstein’s solution was to regard everything else as
a  sort  of  inspired  nonsense,  having  great  value  indeed  for  the  individual,  but
incapable  of  being  exactly  discussed.  Ramsey’s  reaction  was  towards  what  he
himself described as a sort of pragmatism […]. Thus he was led to consider “human
logic” as distinguished from “formal logic.” (1972 [1931]: 338)
46 Keynes was right. By 1929, Ramsey had found the deductive approach a sack of dry bones.
A central point in “Theories” is that questions of usage – in this case, how we use a
scientific theory – are more important than questions of metaphysics. The metaphysics of
logical atomism does not provide enough to go on in real life and real science. Theories
are true or false, not in the strict, atomist sense, but in a holist, pragmatist sense. The way
Ramsey dealt with scientific theories (and everything else that went beyond the primary
system) was very much against the spirit of the late 1920s Vienna Circle. It was to adopt a
pragmatist account truth or falsity, an account that asked whether the consequences of
beliefs meet the future well. 
 
8. Ramsey on Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle,
1929
47 Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge, after his self-imposed exile, on January 17, 1929.
Ramsey died on January 19, 1930. In that year, the two were locked in an almost daily
conversation. One might call it a battle over the right approach to philosophy. As Ramsey
put it, in a 1929 paper titled “Philosophy,” one method, “Ludwig’s,” is to 
construct a logic,  and do all  our philosophical  analysis  entirely unselfconsciously,
thinking all the time of the facts and not about our thinking about them, deciding
what we mean without any reference to the nature of meanings. (P: 5) 
48 Ramsey’s pragmatist method, in contrast, directed us to the human facts, not the facts
somehow abstracted from all human understanding. He thought that we will often run
into terms “we cannot define, but […] can [only] explain the way in which they are used”
(P: 5). He admitted to having once been under the sway of Wittgenstein’s conception of
philosophy:
I  used  to  worry  myself  about  the  nature  of  philosophy  through  excessive
scholasticism. I could not see how we could understand a word and not be able to
recognize whether a proposed definition of it  was or was not correct.  I  did not
realize the vagueness of the whole idea of understanding, the reference it involves
to a multitude of performances any of which may fail and require to be restored. (P:
1-2) 
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49 All this of course foreshadows Wittgenstein’s later move to the idea that meaning is use.
But in 1929, Wittgenstein was still trying to construct an ideal definition in a perfect
language. Ramsey thought that an instance of scholasticism, “the essence of which is
treating what is  vague as if  it  were precise and trying to fit  it  into an exact  logical
category” (P: 7).
50 He opened a draft of “Philosophy” with an explicit reprimand to Wittgenstein:
Philosophy must be of some use and we must take it seriously; it must clear our
thoughts and so our actions, Otherwise it is mere chatter. or else it is a disposition
we have to check […] i.e. the chief proposition of philosophy is that philosophy is
nonsense.  And  again  we  must  then  take  seriously  that  it  is  nonsense,  and  not
pretend, as Wittgenstein does, that it is important nonsense!27
51 We must avoid the “absurd position” of the child in the following dialogue: 
“Say breakfast.” “Can’t.” “What can’t you say?” “Can’t say breakfast.” (P: 6)
52 Wittgenstein maintained that philosophy is nonsense and should be abandoned. Ramsey’s
objection in “Philosophy” was twofold. First, Wittgenstein cannot argue for a particular
view of the nature of meaning, a consequence of which is that the very argument for that
view is meaningless. We do in fact understand Wittgenstein’s philosophical argument. It
is not a ladder that, once climbed, needs to be kicked away. The same point holds for the
Vienna Circle’s dismissal of metaphysics. Second, this kind of philosophy is impoverished.
If, as Wittgenstein thinks, philosophy’s task is to take the propositions of science and
ordinary life and “exhibit them in a logical system with primitive terms and definitions,”
philosophy really is of not much use at all (P: 1). In a note, Ramsey said:
The standardisation of the colours of beer is not philosophy, but in a sense it is an
improvement in notation, and a clarification of thought. (NPPM: 55)
53 Philosophy must be more than an improvement in notation. 
54 It is clear that in 1929, Ramsey’s approach, and his rebellion against Wittgenstein and the
Vienna Circle, was in full swing. He says in another note:
We cannot really picture the world as disconnected selves; the selves we know are
in the world.  What we can’t do we can’t do and it’s  no good trying. Philosophy
comes  from  not  understanding  the  logic  of  our  language;  but  the  logic  of  our
language is not what Wittgenstein thought. The pictures we make to ourselves are
not pictures of facts. (NPPM: 51)
55 If a proposition is a picture of the world, disconnected from any reference to the self
whose picture it is, then we are totally vulnerable to skepticism or solipsism. How are we
to bridge the gap between ourselves and that world? How we can even make claims about
that world? Ludwig’s primary world “contains no thought.”28 If we want to understand
the world, we must not neglect the “subjective side” (P:  6).  Carnap, Ramsey thought,
made the same “mistake”:
Solipsism  in  the  ordinary  sense  in  which  as  e.g.  in  Carnap  the  primary  world
consists of my experiences past present and future will not do. For this primary
world is the world about which I am now thinking […]. (NPPM: 66)
56 We need the irreducible secondary world, full of hypotheses, laws, and claims about the
existence of all manner of objects, if we are to think about the world at all. Carnap’s
mistake  was  to  reduce  a  patch of  red,  say,  into,  say,  infinite  classes  of  points,  thus
destroying its being my patch or your patch. 
57 Ramsey never wrote more about the Vienna Circle. He and Carnap never met. But his
mind was on Carnap during his fatal illness. A month before he died, Ramsey wrote to
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Schlick about the Aufbau, expressing doubts about Carnap’s attempt to reconstruct the
world out of a primary language:
I feel very guilty that I’ve not yet written a review of Carnap’s book, which is really
inexcusable.  I  found it  very interesting,  though some things I  thought certainly
wrong and others I felt very doubtful about.29
58 Ramsey wanted to get “clear about the truth of these things” himself before writing about
the “merits” and the doubtful points in Carnap’s book.
 
9. Conclusion
59 Ramsey cannot be seen as sympathetic to the Vienna Circle, as he knew it. During his
lifetime the Circle’s project was to reduce all meaningful language to a certainly true
empirical foundation. He did not know that more liberal and pragmatist versions would
come  after  his  death.  In  the  early  1930s,  the  Vienna  Circle  started  to  see  that  a
correspondence theory of truth collided with their verificationism – how can we verify
that  which  is  utterly  independent  of  us?  And “the  problem from the  philosophy  of
science” about unobservable entities and theory change also pressed in on them. Philipp
Frank, as early as 1930, suggested that pragmatism was the answer:
The physicist in his own scientific activity has never employed any other concept of
truth than that  of  pragmatism.  The “agreement  of  thoughts  with their  object,”
which  the  school  philosophy  requires,  cannot  be  established  by  any  concrete
experiment  […]  In  reality,  physicists  compare  only  experiences  with  other
experiences. They test the truth of a theory by what it has become customary to
call “agreements.” (1949 [1930]: 101-2)
60 Just like Ramsey, Frank employs the term “school philosophy” as a description of the
project he now thinks is to be avoided in favour of the pragmatist theory of truth. In this
way, and others, too complex to enter into here,30 many in the Circle moved closer to
Ramsey, as their position fractured and evolved into various camps. Had Carnap been
ready for Ramsey’s pragmatism when he first read the Braithwaite volume in the early
1930s, the Circle might well have taken Ramsey’s position as a model, instead of realizing
only  in  the  1950s  that  he  had  important  things  to  offer  a  liberalized  empiricist
philosophy. 
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NOTES
1. Monk also thinks it possible that Wittgenstein took himself to be the one who kept tinkering
with the broken machine.
2. For the full argument about Ramsey’s influence on Wittgenstein, see Misak 2016, and 2020.
3. Ramsey wrote to Schlick in the spring of 1928: “I am thinking of coming to Vienna almost
immediately, and wonder whether, if I did, you or any of your circle would be able to spare a
little time to talk philosophy with me. If you could, I should be extremely grateful as I get very
little stimulus here and make no progress.” (The Vienna Circle Archive, Noord-Hollands Archief:
114-Ram-2.) Schlick was away during Ramsey’s proposed dates, but invited him to come and stay
some other time.
4. For instance, his 1925 “Universals” is an extension and deepening of Wittgenstein’s position
that we cannot specify, a priori, the logical form. See MacBride 2018 for an excellent discussion.
5. See Misak 2020.
6. King’s College Archive FPR 5/5/434. In July 1927, Ramsey would invite Schlick to present a
paper at the Moral Sciences Club – “The Meaning of Cognition.” Schlick’s wife accompanied him
to Cambridge, and they got along very well with the Ramseys.
7. Christoph Limbeck-Lilineau uncovered this story for me.
8. Archives of Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, Han Reichenbach Collection: ASP/
HR-016-42-16.
9. Archives of Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, Han Reichenbach Collection: ASP/
HR-016-42-16.
10. Wittgenstein Collection, Brenner Archive: M31.
11. Vienna Circle Archives, Noord-Hollands Archief: 123/Wittg-1.
12. Archives  of  Scientific  Philosophy,  University  of  Pittsburgh:  Rudolf  Carnap  Collection
025-72-06 42-01: 68, 769.
13. See Carnap, Hahn & Neurath 1973 [1929].
14. The letter is published in McGuinness (2012: 158-61).
15. It’s not clear that Ramsey’s own account was satisfactory. In order to make mathematics a
collection of tautologies, he had to introduce a range of entities to ensure that, when true, ‘a=b’
comes  out  true  on  every  interpretation.  But  the  introduction  of  such  entities  makes  the
tautologies that emerge nothing like the innocent, trivially true, tautologies that Wittgenstein
took to constitute logic.
16. See Archives of Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh: 1983.01: 006-06-1; 1983.01: 
006-06-07.
17. See Russell (1931: 477). 
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18. It’s unclear when Carnap acquired his copy of Braithwaite’s volume, but there is evidence
that it was not many years after its publication. There are extensive comments and annotations
in Carnap’s young hand, and another set in a more elderly hand, and enough years had passed so
that Carnap, in the 1950s, forgot what was in it. See Misak 2020.
19. In Galavotti 1991.
20. Whether or not he went all the way to adopting a pragmatist account of truth, he certainly
adopts a pragmatist account of meaning or content, in which equivalent beliefs have the same
“causal properties” (FP: 44).
21. He also raised more particular problems, such as what is now known as the colour exclusion
problem. See Misak 2020.
22. See Methven (2015: 113).
23. Archives of Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh: RC.1974.0: 102-13-53.
24. See Psillos (1999: 46).
25. See Carnap 1958; Hempel 1958.
26. See Archives of Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh: RC.1974.01: 102-13-53.
27. Archives  of  Scientific  Philosophy,  University  of  Pittsburgh:  1983.01:  006-02-03.  (The
strikethrough is Ramsey’s.)
28. Archives of Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh: 003-30-05.
29. Vienna Circle Archives, Noord-Hollands Archief, #114-Ram-4.
30. See Misak 2020 for more, especially about generalizations and scientific laws.
ABSTRACTS
Frank Ramsey (1903-1930) is usually taken to be sympathetic to the Vienna Circle’s project. I will
argue  that  this  is  not  right.  Ramsey  was  a  pragmatist,  and  he  put  pragmatist  objections  to
Wittgenstein’s  Tractatus,  objections which also had the Vienna Circle as  their  target.  Ramsey
thought the Circle’s position (like Wittgenstein’s) was mistaken in that, instead of starting with
human inquiry,  it  tried  to  construct  the  world  out  of  elementary  particulars  and logic,  and
resulted in an unacceptable solipsism. This paper traces the trajectory of Ramsey’s pragmatist
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